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Australia’s neighbours in the Asia–Pacific are building 
high-quality science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics research capacities and infrastructure. As a 
consequence, Australia’s technological advantage in the 
defence domain is eroding.
To recover that advantage, our policy should be to make the 
most of the knowledge, capability and capacity in Australia’s 
civilian science and innovation sector.
This special report analyses current and prospective 
Australian science, industry and defence science and 
innovation policy.
Taking into account the recently published report of the 
First Principles Review of Defence, the forthcoming 2015 
Defence White Paper and the 2014 Industry Innovation and 
Competitiveness Agenda, this report considers:
• whether Australia is getting the biggest bang for its 
defence research dollar
• if not, what policy options might be available to provide 
better value for money
• how Australia’s defence research and development 
compares against a number of international comparators
• how defence research and development might fit within 
the Industry Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda.
Executive summary
History shows that an innovative community can give a 
nation a competitive edge in times of conflict. But Australia’s 
defence R&D community has recently been shaped more by 
legacy, short-term demands and budget pressures than by 
strategic purpose.
Three dynamics suggest that our defence science policy 
should be updated.
First, technological progress based on sustained investments 
in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
education will play a greater role in regional and global 
security this century than it did in the previous one. As a 
leading scientific and technological nation with a relatively 
small population, Australia should capitalise on defence 
science as a cost-effective hedge against an uncertain 
security future—not least because defence science plays 
an important role in our alliance with the US and strategic 
partnerships across the ‘Five Eyes’ community.
Second, as a result of changes arising from the 2003 Kinnaird 
Defence Procurement Review, the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation (DSTO)—the centrepiece of 
Australia’s defence science ecosystem—now has a greater 
role in the provision of advice, such as capability and risk 
assessments, for the ADF and Defence as a whole. While this 
has fulfilled customer requirements, it raises two questions 
for the Australian Government:
• Could such advice be provided more effectively by the 
private sector, or by academia?
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• Has the allocation of DSTO resources to the ‘valued 
adviser’ role been at the expense of Australia’s defence 
R&D efforts?
In recent years, DSTO has undertaken multiple 
reorganisations in attempts to match its revised role with 
diminishing resources. Those changes have emphasised the 
provision of advice rather than new research efforts, so it was 
unsurprising that the First Principles Review couldn’t discern 
a clear articulation of the value of DSTO’s contribution to 
Defence outcomes.
Third, global R&D expenditure has doubled since 2000, led 
by private companies, universities and research institutions 
rather than by national defence organisations, as it was in 
the 20th century. Research is booming in the Asia–Pacific 
region, and China is projected to surpass the US in total R&D 
expenditure by 2020. While our regional neighbours invest 
proportionally more of their defence budgets in defence 
science, Australia’s defence R&D funding has been more or 
less constant in real terms since 1975, and has thus fallen as a 
proportion of the defence budget.
Australian science and innovation spending (specifically, 
defence R&D spending) hasn’t kept pace with real spending 
growth in other sectors. Government spending on general 
public services, health and housing has grown at more than 
twice the rate of spending on defence science.
As witnessed in Ukraine, the Middle East and elsewhere, 
a diverse range of state and non-state actors are gaining 
access to, developing and using sophisticated technological 
capabilities. The ADF needs to be prepared and equipped 
for a wider range of contingencies. An effective response 
requires greater agility, adaptability and cooperation on the 
part of Australia’s entire science and innovation community. 
Such change requires significant reform because science and 
innovation are a medium- to long-term venture that provides 
greatest returns when undertaken on a sustained, planned 
basis over several years.
In the private sector, science and innovation are increasingly 
undertaken collaboratively between nations and across 
research institutions and companies. That model can 
be adapted to ensure that Australia’s defence R&D effort 
remains effective:
• Treat defence R&D the same way we treat materiel 
acquisition—with an eye to harnessing competition and 
obtaining value for money.
• Focus DSTO’s mission on areas that are not contested by 
private or public organisations or on areas in which DSTO 
can offer and demonstrate a better value for money or 
national interest proposition.
• Establish an Australian Defence Innovation Projects 
Centre to mobilise the 95% of Australia’s research 
community and resources that are outside the Defence 
organisation. Such an initiative, separate from DSTO, 
would build on the success of the Defence Materials 
Technology Centre as part of efforts to build critical 
mass across academia, industry and the government 
research community to produce a viable defence 
innovation network.
• Separate the executive and scientific functions of the 
Chief Defence Scientist. The role of chief executive of 
a $400m+ p.a. government agency conflicts with the 
obligations of the role of independent scientific adviser to 
the Secretary of the Department of Defence, the Chief of 
the Defence Force and the National Security Committee 
of Cabinet. Separating those functions will improve the 
integrity of strategic management, the independence 
of scientific advice in a contestable force development 
process, governance and decision-making transparency.
• Introduce personnel management and security clearance 
structures in the wider research community to enable 
scientists and researchers to move as seamlessly as 
possible between academia and private and public 
laboratories, both in Australia and within the Five 
Eyes community.
• Develop more flexible staffing structures that can readily 
adapt to the emergence of disruptive technologies, and 
update recruitment, retention and career practices. 
Structures that limit external collaboration and workforce 
flexibility, and imbalances in gender and age, limit 
research productivity.
The best option to ensure that the ADF keeps its 
technological edge is to make the most of the full spectrum 
of Australia’s R&D people and assets, from basic and 
applied research to small and medium-sized industries and 
advanced industries.
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Introduction
A question for the Australian Government and the ADF 
is whether today’s defence research ecosystem is fit for 
purpose. For defence research to be effective, investment 
must be commensurate with objectives that contribute 
directly to Australia’s future strategic defence needs.
Rapid growth in the Asia–Pacific region is transforming major 
economies and reshaping geopolitics. Much of that growth 
has been enabled by new technology. In terms of people 
and funding, the total global investment in science and 
technology has never been higher.
Driven by competition, the nature of science, research and 
innovation has changed significantly over the past 15 years. 
However, for reasons explored below, the defence science 
ecosystem, which is largely driven by the public sector, has 
been slow to adapt.
The usual reaction of organisations responding to budget and 
staff cuts is to protect existing programs and activities. This 
creates conditions that discourage risk and inhibit innovation 
and is exacerbated by government signals that no new policy 
or program initiatives will be considered without offsetting 
savings. At a time when Australia faces significant strategic 
and disruptive technological challenges, this is not a strategic 
response for sustaining the ADF’s technological edge.
In the 20th century, national defence budgets were prime 
drivers of technological development. Today, especially with 
the federal budget in deficit and significant fiscal constraints 
on public sector research in organisations such as the 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and 
CSIRO, technology development is increasingly driven by 
the private sector in response to customer demands. New 
mechanisms need to be found to mobilise and harness the 
best and the brightest involved in public sector research, 
industry and academia to collaborate and network to solve 
the scientific and technological challenges emerging in the 
21st century.
The First Principles Review of Defence also reached 
that conclusion:
• Recommendation 2.19: The Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation strengthen partnerships 
with academic and research institutions to leverage 
knowledge and create pathways with academia 
and industry.
• Recommendation 2.21: Defence, in partnership with 
academia and industry, review its research priorities, their 
alignment with future force requirements and capacity to 
leverage allied partners to promote innovation.
Science today is an increasingly collaborative and globally 
competitive endeavour. Scientists and engineers now 
work across institutions, nations, agencies, universities 
and companies in multidisciplinary teams to solve shared 
problems. This trend is driven by value-for-money efficiencies 
as resources, ideas and risks are shared and measured by the 
level of research and commercial success.
Science and innovation that will have a bearing on our 
national defence develop globally and are thus broadly 
accessible to individuals, organisations and nation-states. 
However, Australia’s defence needs are unique, bound as 
they are by geography, competing interests and existing 
strengths. This creates a unique demand for onshore defence 
science capacity.
This report reviews Australian and international defence 
science efforts, noting research topics and priorities to 
illuminate the consideration of policy. It considers whether 
our current arrangements are fit for purpose and explores 
policy options to improve value for taxpayers’ money. 
In the 2014 review of US Department of Defense 
strategy and priorities, the Chairman of the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, wrote: 
‘My greatest concern is that we will not innovate 
quickly enough or deeply enough to be prepared for 
the future, for the world we will face two decades 
from now.’
— US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 
Review 2014, Washington DC, online.
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Australia’s defence science footprint
Since ASPI last reported on Australia’s defence R&D in 
2010,1 the defence R&D budget has come under pressure. 
Total expenditure on defence R&D has fallen steadily since 
2011, and the government R&D share of the overall defence 
budget has dropped from 2% in 2008−09 to a forecast 1.1% 
in 2017−18 (Table 1). Between 2012–13 and 2017–18, DSTO is 
budgeted to reduce expenditure by around $169 million. 
This significant downward adjustment hasn’t been 
accompanied by policy announcements to explain the 
rationale behind it.
In a more complex security environment and with growing 
challenges posed by disruptive technologies, the drop in R&D 
expenditure undermines the technological edge that the ADF 
needs to prevail on the battlefield.
The DSTO element of the R&D budget broadly reflects this 
trend. In 2011−12, DSTO’s budget amounted to $598.8 million. 
In 2017−18, it is forecast to be $384.4 million. Australian 
defence science and technology investment, as a proportion 
of defence spending, is less than that of the Netherlands, 
Canada, Sweden and Singapore. With respect to population 
growth, per person expenditure has more than halved since 
19772. When viewed in constant dollar terms since 1975, this 
suggests that DSTO’s budget is returning to a ‘peacetime’ 
state: it declined after the end of our commitment to 
Afghanistan, just as it did after the Vietnam War, the Gulf War 
and the Iraq War (Figure 1).
Table 1:  Defence and defence R&D expenditure, selected years 2000–01 to 2017–18
Defence 
budget ($m)
Total defence 
R&D ($m)
Govt defence 
R&D ($m)
Govt defence 
R&D (% 
defence 
budget)
Business 
defence R&D 
($m)
Business 
share of 
defence R&D 
(%)
2000–01 14,453 401.1 238.6 1.6 158.1 39.4
2004–05 20,569 616.6 309.3 1.5 278.0 45.1
2008–09 24,081 800.9 486.0 2.0 259.4 32.4
2011–12 26,320 795.9 598.8 2.3 197.1 24.8
2012–13 26,940 n/a 553.8 2.1 n/a n/a
2013–14 27,110 421.2 1.5
2014–15 29,302 416.5 1.4
2015-16 31,863 431.6 1.4
2016-17 31,021 405.1 1.3
2017–18 33,558 384.4 1.1
n/a = data not available 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat. nos. 8109.0, 8104.0 (various), Defence Portfolio Budget statements—various.
Australia and the ADF have gained strategic, tactical and 
budget advantages from DSTO’s R&D efforts through projects 
such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, the Nulka 
active missile decoy, the Laser Airborne Depth Sounder 
system and aircraft structural testing. However, with the 
change in DSTO’s priorities and budget and staffing cuts, it’s 
unlikely that such gains will continue. The long-term R&D 
that led to such innovative technologies is no longer a core 
function of the organisation. Unlike countries such as the 
US and Singapore, we don’t entrust defence research to our 
university sector.
Of equal concern is the drop off in Australian commercial 
defence R&D. The latest statistics (for 2011−12) suggest 
that this component of the defence R&D ecosystem fell 
by around 20% in the previous two years. The 2008 global 
financial crisis and the shift in Defence acquisition policy 
to military-off-the-shelf and civilian-off-the-shelf platform 
solutions may account for some of that decline.
University defence research funding through the Australian 
Research Council (ARC) is also at risk. Following the 
establishment of the Safeguarding Australia national 
research priority in 2002, from 2004 to 2014 the ARC funded 
some 480 projects directly relevant to the defence and 
national security portfolios worth around $120 million 
(Figure 2). One project developed an improved method for 
detecting improvised explosive devices (see box).
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Figure 1:  Funding of DSTO, 1976–2014 (constant 2013 $ million) 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat. no. 8109.0; Defence Portfolio Budget Statements; Reserve Bank.
Figure 2:  Australian Research Council funding, Safeguarding Australia national research priority, 2004–2014
Source: ARC annual reports.
The national research priorities were discontinued in 2013, 
and a new set of science and research priorities is now 
under development.3
The loss of the Safeguarding Australia research priority 
(for which the ARC provided funding across the research 
sector) discourages rather than enables collaborative 
defence research.
The lack of a formal transfer or introduction mechanism for 
research outputs is also disappointing. Such a mechanism 
would allow research conducted under the auspices of 
the ARC to be demonstrated to prospective customers in 
the defence or national security domains and advanced 
from the laboratory bench to production and distribution 
supply chains.
Contrast the case study in the box on the next page with 
recent similar research conducted in Britain by Amethyst 
Research, which was funded under a call for proposals by 
the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s 
(Dstl’s) Centre for Defence Enterprise to develop an infrared 
explosives and chemicals detector. Following the completion 
of that research, Dstl continued its involvement and 
introduced Amethyst to Selex ES, which has a credible supply 
chain for the manufacture and distribution of the detector.
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Case study: Improved detection of explosives
Research into explosives identification has 
traditionally focused on detecting the metal in 
explosive devices. However, the ADF’s experience 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere has shown that 
improvised explosive devices don’t necessarily 
contain metal, and many are placed in man-made 
environments that can contain multiple metal objects. 
The emphasis for explosives detection has therefore 
shifted towards detecting the explosive, rather than 
the metal.
With the assistance of ARC funding through a Super 
Science Fellowship, Dr Georgios Tsiminis and a team 
of researchers at the Institute for Photonics and 
Advanced Sensing at the University of Adelaide have 
developed a family of sensors that can detect minute 
quantities of explosives such as trinitrotoluene (TNT) 
and peroxide-based explosives. The explosives can be 
identified and quantified by using the interaction of 
the explosives’ molecules with light guided through 
specialised glass fibres.
The sensors were developed over a three-year period 
and were completed and demonstrated in 2014. There 
are no plans to proceed any further. 
Given the size of Australian Government defence 
procurements over the coming years, and the national 
security outlook, the new Commonwealth research priorities 
currently under consideration, in whatever combination, 
need to explicitly acknowledge and support defence and 
security-related research.
The Defence organisation uses several programs to 
encourage businesses and universities to invest in R&D, 
most notably the Capability Technology Demonstrator (CTD) 
Program and the CTD Extension Program. Funding for the 
competitive CTD Program, which has operated since 1997, 
has been through the Capability Development Group. The 
program has been administered by DSTO. Funding levels have 
varied over the years, depending on budget constraints and 
the number of worthwhile proposals.
CTD proposals are evaluated against a number of criteria, 
including the proposed technology’s potential to contribute 
to defence capability development, its potential to transition 
into service and its level of innovation. Since 1997, some 
$250 million has been invested in 104 projects. In 2013, 
94 had been completed, 86 had been demonstrated and 
12 were in use with the ADF. In 2014, around $13 million was 
committed to fund seven projects.
Partly to economise, Defence has recently established the 
Defence Innovation Realisation Fund. The fund is to act as a 
clearing-house for various innovation programs supported 
by Defence, such as the Rapid Prototyping, Development and 
Evaluation Program, the CTD Program, the Defence Materials 
Technology Centre, Diggerworks and the Priority Industry 
Capability Innovation Program.
The Defence Innovation Realisation Fund is funded from the 
Defence Capability Plan and administered by DSTO on behalf 
of the Capability Development Group. With the disbanding 
of the group following the First Principles Review, funding 
will presumably be through the Capability Acquisition and 
Sustainment Group. 
As rolling reviews and assessments have reported, the 
success of these programs is dependent on the level of 
funding available. R&D expenditure in Australia as a whole 
has failed to keep pace with real spending growth in other 
sectors, and the defence R&D subsector has stagnated 
(Figure 3).
Indeed, government investment in R&D as a proportion of 
government spending has fallen to a 30-year low (Figure 4). 
This places Australia near the bottom of the OECD ladder for 
R&D expenditure as a share of GDP.
While Australia’s R&D expenditure has been much less than 
the OECD average, our R&D provides a high-quality return 
on investment.4 Australia’s share of the top 1% of the world’s 
publications in natural science and engineering compares 
well with that of Western Europe, the US and Canada, and 
compares even more favourably on a per capita basis.
The approximately $300 billion gross expenditure on all 
science-related R&D in all sectors of the Australian economy 
since 2000 has not only delivered results, but has also 
produced world-class capacity. As the real and relative 
expenditure figures above make clear, growth, excellence, 
infrastructure and capacity have developed outside Defence. 
Given our economic and strategic circumstances, this is 
a major national capacity that should be leveraged for 
the benefit of the ADF. In many fields, we have global best 
practice problem-solving resources, specialist science and 
engineering infrastructure, highly trained talent, high-tech 
skills and world-class knowledge.
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Figure 3:  Real annual growth in budget expenditure since 1995–96 to 2014–15 (%)*
*R&D spending has failed to keep pace with spending growth in other areas. Includes spending from multiple portfolios. 
Source: Fairfax Media data: Budget papers, Parliamentary Library.
Figure 4:  Investment in R&D, 1978–79 to 2014–15 (% of defence budget)
Source: Fairfax Media data: Parliamentary Library, Budget papers.
However, our spending on defence science has diminished in 
recent years, and the strategic focus of that work has become 
blurred. Defence in the 21st century will increasingly depend 
upon technological advantage, so policymakers need to 
consider whether current arrangements are fit for purpose in 
the context of global trends in both general and defence R&D.
Fit for purpose: Australian defence R&D
The Defence R&D ecosystem is in many respects a legacy 
platform. The centrepiece of the system, DSTO, traces its 
modern antecedents back to 1974, when the Australian 
Defence Scientific Service, in-house R&D units of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force and the Science Branch of the Department 
of Defence were amalgamated.
In the context of the upcoming Defence White Paper, we need 
to consider whether the way DSTO is currently configured will 
give the ADF optimal support in the varied deployments and 
conflict scenarios expected in the future.
In 1979, DSTO had a staff of 4,900, of whom around 1,100 
were professional scientists or engineers. Estimated 
expenditure of $100.7 million in 1979–80 covered salaries, 
other administrative and operating expenses, machinery, 
plant, stores and works, the services of 12 defence science 
establishments and laboratories, and the Woomera range. In 
2015 dollars, that’s about $410.7 million.
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The funding in 1979–80 provided $10.5 million for basic 
research, $46.2 million for applied research and $30.8 million 
for experimental development. DSTO’s mission then was 
described as:
To provide scientific and technical advice on defence 
policy matters; to provide scientific and technical support 
to the Defence Force in its task of maintaining effective 
forces in being and for the development of the Force; 
to assist in the selection, acquisition and integration of 
defence materiel (weapons, sensors, platforms, systems); 
to maintain a technology base to support the Defence 
Force, the development of defence and defence industry; 
and to conceive and develop equipment suited to the 
defence needs of Australia.5
At present, DSTO consists of around 2,400 staff at eight 
sites across Australia and has an estimated expenditure 
of $431 million. The funds cover salaries and other 
administrative and operating expenses (expenditure 
associated with DSTO’s facilities is managed separately 
within the Defence portfolio). The bulk of expenditure 
comes in the form of block funding through the Department 
of Defence.
Unlike in 1979, any money raised through external funding 
(outside of Defence and other Australian Government 
departments and agencies) is returned to consolidated 
revenue rather than reinvested. DSTO’s current strategy is 
described by the Chief Defence Scientist as:
… to build on our strength of being a valued adviser 
to government and to focus our efforts towards future 
Defence and national security capability by being a 
collaborative partner and an innovation integrator.6
Within Defence, DSTO has morphed into a ‘one-stop shop’ 
for defence science matters. Its priorities and resource 
focus have subtly shifted over the past few years. Following 
the 2003 Kinnaird review of defence procurement, more 
resources were allocated to respond to requests by the ADF 
and the department on the technological feasibility, maturity 
and overall technical risk of major defence acquisitions 
and capabilities.
Additional resources have been allocated in overcoming 
technology hurdles and system integration challenges and 
in reducing delays that have beset a number of big-ticket 
developmental ‘military acquisitions’, such as the Wedgetail 
airborne early warning and control aircraft, the Tiger 
and MH-90 helicopters, airborne refuelling tankers and, 
most recently, the air warfare destroyer. Those additional 
resources have been at the expense of a domestic defence 
R&D program.
Australia’s partnership with the US provides unparalleled 
access to state-of-the-art defence platforms and systems 
as well as access to other areas of US military, R&D, 
intelligence and security organisations. As the relationship 
has grown closer, the ADF’s interoperability with US forces 
has developed, as have the complexities of equipment and 
software integration. To its credit, DSTO has carved out a 
significant record of achievement in this area and developed 
a unique capability for solving difficult problems.
While Australia’s defence science ecosystem has evolved, 
the development of global science and technology has 
been faster, and in directions difficult to predict. In the 
1970s, worst-case scenario threats were limited to land 
forces coming to Australia by sea and long-range air attack, 
potentially with nuclear weapons. Global development and 
progress in international order have reduced such threats 
but new threats and disruptive technologies have emerged, 
enabled by economic and technological developments.
A variety of prospective disruptive technology threats are 
already appearing from the cyber, space and biological 
spheres. Equally, individuals or loosely arranged 
organisations are also harnessing emerging and relatively 
inexpensive technologies in creative ways to disrupt and to 
do harm. 
In 2013, a series of NeXTech war games initiated by the US 
Department of Defense and led by the Noetic Organisation, 
an Australian-based company, identified a number of 
other technology areas with the potential to affect the 
future strategic environment. They included additive 
manufacturing, autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, 
directed energy and human performance modification.7 Such 
complexities pose challenges at a number of levels for our 
defence and security infrastructure, which has been designed 
to tackle 20th century security challenges.
From the perspective of the ADF, competitive institutional 
responsiveness is needed to deal with future adversaries. 
Rapid technological change is a worldwide trend, and the 
adoption of new technologies can accelerate strategic 
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surprise (consider the role of social media in the ‘Arab 
Spring’). As asymmetrical warfare becomes an operational 
norm, countering the rapid adoption of emerging low-cost 
technologies, such as drones and cyber weapons, by 
non-state actors will be increasingly important to our 
defence. Importantly, effective countermeasures are by 
definition not available off the shelf.
If communities, markets and adversaries are able to adapt 
faster than our defence bureaucracy, then our defence 
capacity will become less effective. If we’re not in the 
business of creating new ideas and rapidly turning new ideas 
into new effects, the ADF will become slower to respond and 
less effective over time.
In order to continue to maintain our technological 
advantage and stay on the cutting edge of technology, 
we must be willing to take risks in our innovation and 
creative thinking.
—Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, ‘Defense 
Innovation Days’ opening keynote (Southeastern New 
England Defense Industry Alliance), 3 September 2014.
Drift
Over the past 15 years, the external drivers of defence R&D 
have included the ADF’s high operational tempo (more 
than 30 operations, with a focus on the Middle East area of 
operations) and, more recently, falling government revenue 
after the mining boom, which has resulted in the series 
of budget cuts noted above. Internally, DSTO’s very high 
turnover of decision-makers has not helped its cause and 
has limited the formulation and management of strategic 
planning for defence science.
Since 2000, there have been five chief defence scientists, 
10 assistant defence ministers (with responsibility for 
defence science) and nine defence ministers.8 The average 
joint duration of a Chief Defence Scientist and both levels of 
minister has been less than a year, and the longest duration 
less than two years. In response to operational needs, 
particularly combat operations and budgetary pressures, 
successive leaders have directed fewer resources (relative 
and actual) to longer term strategic research.
An acquisition/capability approach to defence science 
management would ensure greater strategic consideration 
and medium- to long-term control. This would allow stability, 
which would provide capacity to plan and time to undertake 
high-impact research. It would also ensure that the strategic 
objectives are pursued. This would require formal medium- 
to long-term input by the ADF on research directions 
and assessments.
The current model provides few incentives for innovation 
to meet Australia’s unique defence needs, according to 
our geography and strategic interests. It also encourages 
the maintenance of the status quo, rather than promoting 
innovative approaches and risk-taking in research. Under 
the current framework, in the absence of a customer 
requirement, the likelihood of DSTO developing a promising 
blue-sky technology is remote.
Indeed, given modern R&D practices, the extent of 
collaborative engagement defines the likelihood of deploying 
major innovations. The lack of such progress in the past few 
years has reduced collective confidence in our capacity for 
defence innovation.
The metamorphosis of DSTO, Australia’s premier defence 
research establishment, into a technology management 
advisory body has probably been less a consequence of 
deliberate strategic policy and more a response to short-term 
political, financial and acquisition expediencies. It was 
unsurprising that the First Principles Review team was 
unable to discern a clear articulation of the value of DSTO’s 
contribution to Defence outcomes.
While DSTO provides highly qualified expertise to the ADF, its 
infrastructure and human resources remain mostly geared 
for pre-2000 science and technology. This suggests that the 
talents of its scientists, technicians and engineers, along with 
its specialised facilities, equipment and resources, may be 
underutilised. Within the defence portfolio, significant scope 
exists to update R&D structures and introduce more flexible 
working arrangements that enable the broader science and 
innovation community to be more actively engaged.
Applying a defence acquisition/capability funding approach, 
either partly or wholly, would also allow the ADF to have 
more of a say on research directions and the measurement 
of deliverables.
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DSTO’s change of its main role to ‘valued adviser’9 suggests 
that it brings to defence and national security expertise 
that is not and will not be readily available from the private 
sector or academia. It also suggests that strategic defence 
and national security research is no longer a worthwhile 
government undertaking. These assumptions should 
be questioned.
The ability of any organisation to remain fit for purpose 
lies in part in its ability to adapt. Because risk aversion is a 
characteristic cultural trait of advisory bodies, DSTO’s change 
of focus is a concern for defence technology innovation and 
for DSTO as an organisation.
The role of defence science as a key element of the art of 
warfare has been subsumed in the quest for savings and 
by risk assessment and risk mitigation activities. Given 
the power and availability of modern high-tech weaponry 
(particularly in the hands of non-state actors), our defence 
science investment should be considered in the same manner 
as materiel acquisitions.
Covering the waterfront
The Defence issues paper 2014 noted that ‘Australia has 
long had a highly capable DSTO that works to enhance ADF 
equipment and personal performance.’10 Key questions for 
the 2015 Defence White Paper to address are to ask: How 
Defence should best use science and technology capabilities 
in coming years? How can innovation be promoted more 
effectively? How should Defence draw on the private sector 
and Australia’s university and research sectors to help sustain 
and improve critical military capabilities?
There’s no doubt that DSTO has proven itself in certain 
disciplines, such as radar, weapons systems and system 
integration, and that it includes a cadre with unique 
world-leading skills and expertise, but whether the current 
model of covering the entire defence R&D waterfront makes 
sense is another matter.
The 2015 Defence White Paper will produce a medium 
to longer term plan informed by R&D needs, threats 
and opportunities, including some accommodation for 
the unknown in future technological developments. 
Government expenditure on both civilian and defence R&D 
will be constrained for the foreseeable future, so we should 
make sure that our defence research ecosystem functions 
efficiently, as well as effectively.
This approach has been adopted in the UK, Japan and 
Canada. Together with the US, these countries recognise that 
it’s no longer practical to have defence research institutions 
that cover the entire waterfront.11 Rather, their governments 
have decided (and in some cases mandated) that government 
funding be redirected to universities and industry to solve 
defence and national security problems.
A range of relationships and agreements support DSTO 
activities with firms and universities. Yet, despite the 
arrangements, DSTO directs only 5%–10% of its budget to 
industry and academia. If Defence funding administered by 
DSTO is included (such as the CTD Program), the proportion 
increases to 20%–30% (Figure 5).
In contrast, the UK’s Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (Dstl), which has around 3,600 employees 
and a budget of £617 million for defence-related activity 
and £661 million for non-defence (national security) 
related activity, outsources more than 75% of its research 
budget. Similarly, Canada’s military research laboratory 
(Defence Research and Development Canada) consists 
of 1,160 employees and spends more than 60% of its 
C$270 million research budget externally. Japan’s 
Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), with 
1,082 employees, allocates about 80% of its budget to 
industry and academia.
In the US, the Naval Research Laboratory contracts out 
around 54% of its budget to external providers, while 
the scientific research arm of the US Air Force contracts 
around 70%. The US Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), which operates with around 
240 employees, commits its entire research funding 
allocation of US$2.8 billion to industry, universities and other 
research bodies.
To provide impetus to agencies to outsource as much of 
their budgets as possible, the US Government introduced 
the Federal Technology Transfer Act in 1986 to encourage 
the commercial use of technology developed in federal 
laboratories. The Act allows government inventors and the 
laboratories where they work to share royalties generated by 
commercial licensing of their inventions. It also encourages 
the establishment of cooperative research and development 
agreements between, for example, national research 
laboratories and non-federal entities, such as state and local 
governments, universities and business corporations.
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Figure 5:  Defence R&D expenditure, employees and A$m spent externally, UK, Japan, Canada and Australia, 2013–14
Dstl = Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (UK); TRDI = Technical Research and Development Institute (Japan); DRDC = Defence 
Research and Development Canada; DSTO = Defence Science and Technology Organisation  (Australia).
Sources: Dstl, TRDI, DRDC & DSTO budget statements.
Case study: Precision inertial sensing—an 
example of DSTO making a difference.
In 2011, the Australian National University (ANU) 
Quantum Sensor and Atom Laser Group teamed with 
DSTO to embark on the construction of a cold atom 
precision inertial sensor, a gravimeter, that would be 
the prototype for future field-deployable sensors for 
defence and national security. The project was funded 
through DSTO at a little more than $1 million over 
one year.
The task of improving the sensitivity of existing ANU 
sensors by five orders of magnitude was a substantial 
one for a small team. However, the decision to go 
ahead was made after careful consideration of the 
advanced nature of the cold atom sources, optical 
sources and precision coupling of light and matter, 
which the ANU team had developed over the 
previous decade.
The project was completed a few weeks ahead 
of deadline and on budget. The gravimeter was 
comparable in sensitivity to the very few existing 
precision cold atom devices around the globe and 
catapulted Australia to the forefront of this research 
field. Since then, the group has received a further 
$400,000 in funding from DSTO to continue to develop 
the device.
Stable funding would enable the team at ANU to 
engineer this device into a field-deployable unit that 
could substantially enhance the ADF’s capability in a 
variety of critical scenarios.
Security concerns are often cited as a reason why 
independent advice or services can’t be obtained externally 
by Defence or DSTO. In a submission to the Productivity 
Commission in 2006, Professor Donald Sinnott queried the 
extent to which national security might be compromised by 
moving away from in-house provision:
Without detailed inside knowledge, which security 
considerations would normally preclude, it is difficult 
for an ‘outsider’ to challenge such agency judgments. 
But circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the 
‘security/confidentiality’ flag is all too readily used to 
ensure research is kept in-house. For example, in other 
countries defence research, some of it heavily classified, 
is carried out in many universities to a far greater extent 
than in Australia. In the US, as the draft research report 
notes, the Defence Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) 
spends its entire massive research budget externally.12
The Industry Innovation and Competitiveness 
Agenda
In 2014, the government released an action plan for 
a stronger Australia—the Industry Innovation and 
Competitiveness Agenda. The plan included initiatives to 
strengthen Australia’s competitiveness by:
• reducing the burden of regulation and taxation
• increasing student engagement in science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM)
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• attracting highly skilled migrants to address short-term 
skill gaps
• establishing ‘growth centres’ covering five 
promising industries:
– food and agribusiness
– mining equipment, technology and services
– oil, gas and energy services
– medical technologies and pharmaceuticals
– advanced manufacturing.
The government also signalled that it would work with 
industry and researchers on a plan to focus its $9 billion per 
year investment in research to achieve a better commercial 
return. It said that particular attention should be paid to:
• working with the research sector and industry to identify 
and implement policy and program changes to ensure 
that the research effort addresses national priorities and 
supports the translation of research into commercial 
outcomes
• sharpening incentives for collaboration between 
researchers and industry, ensuring that research training 
adequately prepares researchers, and supporting 
the provision and maintenance of world-class 
research infrastructure.
The agenda made no mention of defence innovation as a 
potential growth driver for the economy. It’s hoped that this 
omission will be corrected in the upcoming Defence Industry 
Policy Statement.
In addition to the work on Australia’s national research 
priorities, led by Australia’s Chief Scientist, Professor Ian 
Chubb, the Chief Scientist is also looking for initiatives to lift 
Australia’s STEM profile. In September 2014, the Office of the 
Chief Scientist published Science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics: Australia’s future,13 which was based on a 2013 
position paper titled Science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics in the national interest: a strategic approach.14 
STEM: Australia’s future calls for a whole-of-government 
approach to investment in STEM.
The second meeting of the Commonwealth Science Council, 
held in April 2015,15 agreed on a further work program, 
including the government response to the STEM: Australia’s 
future report and the adoption of science and research 
priorities. The meeting communiqué stated that the strategic 
science and research priorities would be announced shortly.
Pertinent to defence science and industry is the point, 
made in STEM: Australia’s future, that ‘Collaboration also lifts 
the capacity of Australian SMEs to break into global value 
chains, at the high-value end where we can compete.’16 A key 
recommendation for government is to adopt an international 
strategy for science, research and education that provides for 
collaborative activities, excellence-driven institutional and 
individual collaborations, and business partnerships.
Current defence procurement plans suggest that Australia 
will spend some $50 billion offshore during the next decade.17 
Significant procurements likely to be foreshadowed in the 
2015 Defence White Paper include replacements for our 
frigates, land combat vehicle systems and submarines.
Unlike other nations, Australia steers clear of using its 
national government’s purchasing power to drive innovation. 
However, the OECD considers that, as a large-scale purchaser 
of goods and services, the public sector is in a strong 
position to promote innovation by being an informed and 
demanding buyer.18 
Part of the problem is a lack of effective mechanisms to foster 
innovation through promoting greater collaboration between 
suppliers and the government as a customer.
In 2013–14, funding to take research from discovery to 
defence acquisition amounted to $15 million (not including 
co-investment from the research sector or industry). With 
the exception of the Defence Materials Technology Centre 
(government, $7 million; industry, $4−6 million; research 
sector, $8 million), current programs focus relatively modest 
resources on industry development.
While improvements have been made over the past several 
years to engage the rest of Australia’s R&D ecosystem, those 
improvements have occurred off a very low base. In terms 
of real and relative investment, the level of engagement 
remains inadequate. Given Australia’s fiscal position, the 
country can’t afford the luxury of operating a defence R&D 
model largely independent from the rest of the Australian 
research community. 
We need to develop programs and initiatives that seamlessly 
integrate the two and provide incentives for Australian 
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civilian researchers to become involved in solving and 
addressing defence and national security problems and 
challenges. Other countries are productively using a variety 
of mechanisms to leverage their civilian R&D base to address 
defence challenges. In Australia, this legacy separation is 
hindering defence science productivity.
Two programs operating in the US have a proven record of 
success in harnessing civilian researchers and R&D for the 
benefit of defence:
• Small Business Innovation Research Program
The US Congress created the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) Program in 1982 to help small 
businesses participate more actively in federal R&D. All 
federal government departments and agencies with 
an extramural R&D budget exceeding $100 million are 
required to participate in the program. SBIR is the largest 
source of early-stage technology financing in the US. Total 
federal SBIR funding in financial year 2013−14 amounted 
to $2.5 billion. The US Department of Defense accounts 
for nearly half of the total program. The program funds 
early-stage R&D in small technology companies and is 
designed to stimulate technological innovation, increase 
private sector commercialisation of federal R&D, increase 
small business participation in federally funded R&D, and 
foster participation by minority and disadvantaged firms 
in technology innovation.
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DARPA was created to fill a gap between the work of the 
military service R&D organisations (the equivalent of 
DSTO) and fundamental research in which new science, 
new ideas and radical new concepts emerge. Through 
the management and direction of basic and applied 
R&D projects, DARPA advances research and technology 
where risk and pay-off are high to very high. The agency 
seeks to mine fundamental discoveries, accelerate their 
development and lower their risk until they prove their 
promise and can be adopted by the services.
DARPA operates with low overheads, directing 90% of its 
funding to a mix of university-based researchers, start-up 
firms, established firms and industry consortiums. There’s 
no dividing line between basic research and applied 
research, since the two are deeply intertwined. The goal 
is to produce usable technological advances. DARPA’s 
mandate extends to helping firms get products to the stage of 
commercial viability.
In support of DARPA’s 2015 open call for new technology, 
DARPA Technology Transfer Office Director Dr Brad Tousley 
said, ‘We’re looking for ideas that show significant promise 
to enable revolutionary new mission capabilities, significant 
increases in mission effectiveness and dramatically reduced 
system costs.’19 Part of DARPA’s task is to use its oversight 
role to link ideas, resources and people in constructive ways 
across different R&D sites.20 Projects are typically 3−5 years 
in duration and have a strong focus on end goals. Ambitious 
public ‘grand challenges’ harness the talents of world-class 
experts drawn from industry and academia to work in 
temporary teams on projects of relatively short duration.
Google has adopted the DARPA model,21 and similar 
organisational structures have been established to 
support the US intelligence community (IARPA), the Energy 
Department (ARPA-E22) and Homeland Security (HSARPA23). 
Other countries have also adopted and adapted the DARPA 
model to suit their particular circumstances.
Outsourcing defence science
In December 2014, the Australian Government released 
a ministerial paper titled Smaller government—towards a 
sustainable future, which sets out a new governance policy.24 
The policy seeks to ensure that government decisions to 
establish new bodies, or to review existing ones, accord with 
the most efficient governance arrangements for the delivery 
of government goods and services.
A three-stage ‘gateway’ process tests whether:
• the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to 
undertake an activity
• there’s an advantage in delivery through a government 
provider, as opposed to a non-government provider
• the activity can be consolidated into an existing body or 
warrants a new autonomous structure.
Reviews of the departments of Education and Health have 
been completed and the 2015 Budget signalled that a further 
eight departments and agencies would be reviewed in 
2015–2016 to determine whether the current functions are 
aligned with the Government’s policy priorities and whether 
they’re working as efficiently as possible. 
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The idea of outsourcing DSTO was noted by the 2014 National 
Commission of Audit,25 whose recommendations formed 
part of the terms of reference of the First Principles Review 
of Defence.26 
The National Commission of Audit recommended that 
‘DSTO should be assessed for its outsourcing potential’,27 
noting that DSTO ‘was not tested as part of Defence’s earlier 
outsourcing efforts’. The question of outsourcing DSTO has 
been looked at in past reports, including Future directions for 
the management of Australia’s defence in 199728 and DSTO’s 
External Engagement and Contribution to Australia’s Wealth in 
200429 Neither report recommended outsourcing.
The National Commission of Audit suggested that the 
Department of Defence ‘should compare a fully costed 
in-house bid to that offered by industry to provide confidence 
that the chosen option represents best value for money’ 
because the ‘default position should remain that, apart from 
combat and combat-related functions, all Defence activities 
are contestable’. 
The First Principles Review was completed in April 2015. The 
findings will inform the development of the 2015 Defence 
White Paper.30 Insofar as outsourcing DSTO was concerned, 
the Review sensibly recommended that:
Whilst wholesale outsourcing [of DSTO] would not be 
wise, there is more opportunity to outsource elements 
to the broader scientific community, particularly in 
industry and academia. We recommend that strong 
partnerships be established with key academic and 
research institutions to leverage the knowledge 
of scientists and create pathways into and out of 
academia and industry.31
The 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers paid attention 
to Australia’s defence science and technology effort. Each 
included a chapter outlining Australia’s defence science 
interests and needs. While both chapters guided important 
initiatives to strengthen defence science, including 
engagement with academia, their main weakness was that 
the focus was DSTO-centric. Given the recommendation of 
the First Principles Review, it’s hoped that the 2015 White 
Paper will pay more attention to the instruments that might 
be used to establish strong and transparent partnerships 
with academia and industry.
In all areas of research, the efficient and effective use of an 
institution’s resources necessitates timely access to national 
and international science infrastructure, data, talent and 
services. While obvious security considerations exist, making 
the best use of the vast majority of Australia’s research 
infrastructure, which is outside DSTO, to build our strategic 
defence is the key.
One way to achieve this would be to scale up academic and 
defence industry engagement by building on the original 
concept behind the successful Defence Materials Technology 
Centre. For example, an Australian Defence Innovation 
Projects Centre (ADIPC) could co-fund joint academic, public 
and private sector projects that tackle emerging disruptive 
technologies of concern and interest to the ADF.
Such an initiative, which would have attributes of the DARPA 
model, would reinvigorate the Australian defence R&D 
agenda and provide a focal point for commercialisation 
efforts. This initiative should be equipped with the capacity 
to attract the best and the brightest involved in public sector 
research, industry and academia to meet 21st century 
defence scientific and technological challenges. One goal 
of the ADIPC would be to mobilise the 95% of Australia’s 
research community and resources that are outside Defence 
for strategic defence needs.
As the Defence Materials Technology Centre has 
demonstrated, research sector and industry collaborators 
are willing to commit necessary co-investment and accept 
associated risks if the program is designed efficiently 
from the beginning and overheads are kept to a minimum. 
However, significant returns won’t be gained from the 
$9 billion Australian research system (and those of our allies) 
if strategic collaborative investment is less than the critical 
mass required to carefully spread risk and bring about 
collaborative arrangements that can compete internationally.
Australia’s defence research and industry sector doesn’t 
have the function provided in the US by DARPA: Defence-led 
management and direction of basic and applied R&D projects 
within industry and academia. In the past, part of DSTO’s task 
was to do such basic and applied research as was regarded 
as sufficient for ADF and national security needs. The real 
and relative diminution of defence science budgets over the 
decades and the booming globalisation of R&D both suggest 
that it’s time to seriously consider revamping the current 
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model and building on a concept that’s been able to attract 
and mobilise private and academic interests and resources.
The DARPA model was acknowledged in the recent Australian 
Technology Network of Universities report prepared by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers titled Innovate and prosper: 
ensuring Australia’s future competitiveness through university–
industry collaboration, which was released by the Minister 
for Industry and Science on 30 March 2015.32 The report 
stated that ‘DARPA represents an impressive example of 
government, industry and university collaboration with 
relatively small investment from companies and universities 
in projects with short timescales.’33
By contrast, current Australian efforts ($15 million p.a. or 
3% of the defence R&D budget, excluding collaborative 
co-investment) are spread thinly across the maturity 
spectrum. The programs are small, with unnecessarily high 
overheads in staff, application and monitoring costs. 
Several times that investment in defence–academic–industry 
collaboration is needed to stimulate and leverage emerging 
Australian science and technology and problem-solving 
ability to deliver revolutionary mission capabilities (see box), 
dramatically reduced system costs, or both.
Submarine tech
Over the next 10–15 years, remotely operated 
underwater vehicles are likely to have a disruptive 
impact similar to that of remotely operated aerial 
vehicles over the past 15 years. Major navies are 
already operating such platforms to complement 
their submarine forces and perform tasks that would 
otherwise put their sailors at risk.34
In Australia, the proposed ADIPC could enable 
collaboration among the Royal Australian Navy, 
DSTO, CSIRO, the Australian Maritime College, the gas 
and drilling industry and Australian universities on a 
long-term R&D program to develop such capability. 
The Navy’s cutting edge would be sharpened by this 
strategic collaborative research response to this 
potentially game-changing technology.
Given their mutual interest in underwater drones, the 
UK, Canada and New Zealand could also collaborate, 
thereby using their research and industrial capacity 
for mutual benefit.
Functions of the office of the Chief Defence 
Scientist
Another element of Australia’s legacy platform requires a 
rethink: the two hats worn by the Chief Defence Scientist 
(CDS). The CDS is not only the government’s principal 
adviser on defence science matters but also the chief 
executive officer of DSTO. While the First Principles Review 
recommendation that DSTO become part of the Capability 
Acquisition and Sustainment Group35 was rejected, the 
scientific advisory and strategic management roles should 
be distinct.
After the 2003 Kinnaird review of Defence procurement, 
the government provided the office of the CDS with a 
remit to provide independent advice. In practice, because 
DSTO’s advice is ‘on tap’ and the CDS is ‘responsible 
for DSTO’s wellbeing’, there’s an incentive to discharge 
both responsibilities in a mutually supportive fashion. 
This is a sensible attitude for a leader of a government 
agency, particularly in times of budgetary constraint and 
interdepartmental and intragovernmental competition 
for funds.
However, because scientific and technical knowledge is 
increasingly found across disciplines, institutions and 
countries, there’s a growing tension between how to acquire 
best available advice and how to advance one’s own agency. 
Practically, there’s some degree of disincentive to go beyond 
DSTO or Defence to form judgements, solve problems and 
advance research.
Separating the executive and advisory functions of the CDS 
office would ensure that distinct responsibilities are assigned 
for the strategic management of the science and technology 
organisation and for the scientific leadership of research, 
development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) within the 
Department of Defence and the national security community.
A separate chief executive officer to lead and manage 
DSTO would enhance governance and decision-making 
transparency. The CDS would have a clear remit to lead 
research and to secure and communicate the best possible 
scientific and technical advice available within Australia, from 
international academia and from the defence science and 
technology agencies of our allies.
With a separate role, the CDS could pay greater attention 
and apply more scientific expertise to the quality and 
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timeliness of technical advice provided to the ADF service 
chiefs, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group 
and the Defence Materiel Organisation, and subsequently 
to procurement assessment gateway reviews for capital 
acquisition projects. Sitting outside DSTO, the CDS would 
report to the Secretary of the Defence Department and have 
advisory obligations to both the Chief of the Defence Force 
and the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Greater 
attention and management expertise would be afforded to 
the CEO of DSTO to manage the strategic interests of a major 
research organisation.
In the UK, the roles are separated. The UK’s Chief Scientific 
Adviser is responsible for providing strategic management 
of science and technology issues in the Ministry of Defence, 
most directly through the ministry’s research budget of well 
over £1 billion. The Chief Scientific Adviser also sits as a full 
member of the Defence Management Board and the Defence 
Council, the two most senior management boards within 
the ministry.
The chief executive of Dstl (the UK’s equivalent of DSTO) 
is responsible for ensuring that the requirements for 
managing public monies are met and that proper procedures 
are followed for securing regularity, propriety, value for 
money and feasibility in the handling of the public funds 
administered by Dstl.
In the US, the chief executives of the various defence research 
laboratories and establishments are separated from those in 
the Pentagon responsible for the strategic management of 
science and technology issues and the overall distribution of 
the federal defence science and technology budget.
Personnel limitations
Technological trends also influence the ability of research 
organisations such as DSTO to recruit and retain high-level 
talent. DSTO is in a difficult position, as a significant cadre 
of scientists and researchers recruited during the 1980s 
and 1990s is reaching retirement age. Australian Public 
Service and Defence recruitment freezes and staff cuts over 
several years are hindering DSTO’s ability to refresh its pool 
of researchers, engineers, scientists and technicians. It’s a 
major concern that graduate recruitment rounds have been 
restricted or cancelled over the past three years.
Adapted recruitment and retention practices are needed to 
attract and retain high-quality staff and to redress chronic 
gender and age imbalances. The inefficiencies caused by 
retirements and the under-representation of women in 
researcher and scientist ranks should be addressed by 
ensuring that external collaboration mechanisms enrich 
potential career paths. Greater collaboration with both 
industry and academia can also address the STEM education 
challenge,36 which is currently a focus of government 
science policy.
As evidenced by the disruptive technologies on the horizon, 
Defence and DSTO need to establish a human resource 
model that encourages mobility among the defence research 
community. The skilled scientists and researchers currently 
employed mightn’t necessarily be the scientists and 
researchers needed to address those technologies.
An ability to apply talent, internally and externally via 
collaboration, to emerging challenges will be a pivotal 
capacity. To strengthen that capability, we urgently need to 
implement a security clearance framework for researchers in 
academia and other government research agencies. It should 
be modelled on the current contractor security clearance 
framework, prequalifying researchers to allow them to work 
on defence and national security research projects.
Successive budget cuts and reforms (driven by continuous 
reviews) have diminished and fatigued DSTO’s human 
resources. Because certain highly educated specialists are in 
very high demand in the mining, banking, manufacturing and 
IT sectors here and overseas, we need to provide stability, 
career structure and strategic purpose to compete against 
higher salaries on offer elsewhere.
Consideration also needs to be given to enabling 
academics and researchers from other government 
research agencies to transition employment conditions of 
service and superannuation arrangements so that they’re 
not disadvantaged while working on defence-related 
R&D projects.
The lack of security clearances and the transfer arrangements 
for working in a government defence laboratory have 
previously restricted and delayed research associated 
with defence activity. Investment is also needed to put in 
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place secure rooms and secure IT capability in university 
and research institute buildings to allow researchers and 
scientists ready access to required infrastructure and to 
aid timeliness.
International trends
Despite the 2008 global financial crisis, annual global 
investment in science and technology has more than doubled 
since 2000. Today, it’s estimated to be US$1.6 trillion per 
year,37 of which the Australian Government funds $9 billion, 
producing approximately 3% of the world’s research and 4% 
of citations from 0.3% of the global population.
Research is booming in the Asia–Pacific. China is projected 
to surpass the US in total R&D expenditure by 2020, having 
recently overtaken the EU. In physics and astronomy, it’s now 
the leading producer of citable documents.38 Driving this 
transformation is China’s policy to spend 2.5% of GDP on R&D 
by 2020.39 Today, its research intensity is on par with the EU28 
average (2%). China now has six universities in the top 200 of 
the Shanghai ranking,40 compared to just one in 2005.
Australia’s regional neighbours are investing proportionally 
more of their budgets in R&D. This extends to defence RDT&E: 
IHS Jane’s data suggests that, on current budget projections, 
Australian RDT&E growth will lag behind eight countries in 
the Asia–Pacific region by 2021 (Figure 6).
The process of science, research and innovation is 
changing in response to increased investment, cheaper 
communication and the proliferation of technological 
endeavours worldwide. These changes influence Australia’s 
overall strategic environment and outlook.
Science today is highly collaborative and globally 
competitive, and scientists and engineers increasingly 
work across institutions, nations, agencies, universities 
and companies in multidisciplinary teams to solve shared 
problems.41 The trend is driven by the quest for efficiency, as 
resources, ideas, talent, data, knowledge and risks are openly 
pooled.42 This networked approach affords ready access 
to tools and resources, which increases responsiveness to 
discoveries and technological developments and as a result 
transnational collaborations are increasing rapidly.
Figure 6:  Defence RDT&E, projected average annual change from 2015 to 2021, selected countries (%)
Source: Graphic by Inga Ting; data from IHS Jane’s (January 2015).
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At his ceremonial swearing-In on 6 March 2015, US 
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said:
As technology and globalization revolutionize 
how the world works, and also as the 
Pentagon’s budget tightens, we have the 
opportunity to open ourselves up to new 
ways of operating, recruiting, buying, 
innovating, and much more.  America is home 
to the world’s most dynamic businesses 
and universities.  We have to think outside 
this five-sided box and be open to their best 
practices, ideas, and technologies.43
Since the global financial crisis, a number of countries 
in the OECD have repositioned their R&D and innovation 
policies to capture the benefits of this networked approach 
and to expedite the process of turning scientific discovery 
to commercial or national applications.44 Such initiatives 
have included Germany’s new ‘high-tech strategy’,45 
the UK’s Catapult Centres46 and the US’s Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership.
Currently, Australia is ranked in the bottom quartile of 
OECD countries for business-to-research collaboration. For 
strategic and economic reasons, we need to adjust to this 
evolving technological networked revolution.
Conclusions
The adaptation of Australia’s defence R&D engine is 
warranted because our defence science footprint is 
diminishing at a time when our strategic outlook is becoming 
much more complex and global technological and defence 
science trends are rapidly evolving. Fortunately, appropriate 
adaptation is manageable and would be a cost-effective 
strategic investment, especially as we can leverage most of 
our public and private research sectors.
Australia’s assets don’t include cheap labour, a huge 
population or vast capital. However, we have an advantage 
that most countries lack: deep technological problem-solving 
expertise, born from decades of public investment.
The upstream infrastructure that offers Australia’s 
universities, research institutions and industry opportunities 
to collaborate with Defence on basic and applied research 
challenges needs to be rebuilt. Refocusing DSTO on strategic 
basic and applied research and rebalancing defence science 
resources to enable effective collaboration and networking 
(to a level more closely mirroring that adopted overseas) is 
one approach.
The siloed internalised nature of Australia’s defence R&D 
system is inconsistent with how defence R&D is being 
conducted by Australia’s allies, which engage in a highly 
collegial and globally networked endeavour. The other 
major difference is our level of expenditure. Current policy, 
which can be seen as ‘cut back to only essential needs’, is 
short-sighted.
The changing nature of technological progress, especially 
globalisation and commercialisation, suggests that an 
internal advisory defence science function is unlikely to meet 
Australia’s future defence technology needs. It certainly 
won’t make the most of our broader research investment, or 
that of our allies.
The scaling back of Australia’s defence R&D efforts over 
the past decade isn’t in the nation’s strategic interest. That 
it seems to have been unintentional or a by-product of 
other defence policies suggests that it was a mistake by 
omission. The shift of DSTO’s mission from open-ended 
problem-solving to risk mitigation tasks, to create a 
technology management consulting organisation, leaves a 
significant gap in Australia’s defence R&D ecosystem—one 
that’s likely to have significant adverse ramifications in the 
medium to longer term.
The difficulty of research planning and investment, involving 
guidance based on reactive interests, has fostered a 
short-term service provision posture. If defence science is 
to contribute directly to our strategic defence, as it does for 
our major allies, then the production of transformational 
and disruptive innovation is required. Because such an 
effort is significant (involving hundreds of millions of dollars 
over many years), defence science investment should be 
considered in the same manner as materiel acquisition; 
that is, it should be thoroughly scoped, planned and 
monitored over the long term in the light of well-established 
strategic objectives.
Better value for money can also be achieved by updating 
DSTO’s mission to focus on areas that are demonstrably 
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uncontestable by either private or public organisations. The 
establishment of the Australian Defence Innovation Projects 
Centre, proposed in this report, would provide Defence with 
the mechanism it needs to unlock the 95% of Australia’s 
research community and resources that is currently not 
methodically or entrepreneurially tapped.
Separating the executive and advisory functions of the office 
of the Chief Defence Scientist would ensure that distinct 
responsibilities are established for strategic organisational 
management and the provision of scientific leadership 
and advice.
The recruitment and retention of high-quality staff are core 
to the efficiency and capacity of the defence R&D ecosystem. 
Creating flexible working arrangements to greatly improve 
mobility between government, industry and academic 
organisations (including the organisations of our allies) 
could enrich career paths to address current gender and 
age limitations.
The changing nature of technological evolution, global 
research practices and defence science policy described in 
this report should inform current thinking about Australia’s 
strategic defence.
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